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Evidence
By RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD* AND CAROLYN M. GEISLER*
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky courts faced a number of significant issues in evi-
dence law during the Survey period.' Several decisions dealt with
character evidence and problems arising from the admission of
evidence of prior criminal acts of the accused, either as substan-
tive evidence or for impeachment. This Survey will highlight
these cases and to a lesser degree discuss cases on hearsay admis-
sions, opinion, the Kentucky Dead Man Statute and privilege,
which also were decided during the Survey period. 2
I. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
The proper use of character evidence is confusing to both
lawyers and law students. Whether character evidence is used
for substantive purposes3 or impeachment, 4 many of the "nuts
and bolts" are the same. For example, the common law of Ken-
tucky generally permits proof of character only by way of reputa-
tion, rather than by opinion or by specific acts or instances,
" Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1969, J.D. 1976, Ohio
State University.
J.D. Candidate 1983, University of Kentucky.
1 This Survey eriod includes June 1980 through June 1982. For purposes of conti-
nuity and utility, the authors have followed the format suggested in prior Surveys of Ken-
tucky Evidence Law, e.g., Lawson, Kentucky Law Survey-Evidence, 66 KY. L.J. 18
(1977-78), and R. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EViDENcE LAW HANDBOOK (1976) [hereinafter
LAWSON]. The authors hope this Survey can serve as an interim supplemeit to the latter
work.
2 This Survey does not treat but takes this opportunity to point out the following
cases: Jones v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1981) (separation of witnesses;
abuse of discretion in excluding testimony of witness); Hatfield v. Commonwealth, Dept.
of Transportation, 626 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1982) (permitting introduction of comparable
sales outside of the county in a condemnation proceeding); City of Louisville v. Courier-
Journal and Louisville Times Co., 637 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (protecting disclo-
sure of police department internal affairs investigatory files but approving of disclosure to
public of initial complaints and action taken).
3 LAWSON, sipra note 1, § 2.05 & 2.10.4 Id. §4.15.
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whether the evidence is offered for substantive purposes5 or for
purposes of impeachment. 6 "Mechanics" aside, it is much more
likely that character evidence will be admitted when it is offered
to undermine a witness's credibility than when it is offered as a
way of directly suggesting guilt in a criminal case or liability in a
civil case. 7 Specifically, considerable care is exercised to insure
that a jury will not be permitted to infer, from evidence of a
party's character or act," that he or she acted in conformity there-
with on the particular occasion that is the subject of the prosecu-
tion or litigation. On the other hand, when character evidence or
evidence of a prior crime is offered for impeachment purposes,
the courts begin with the presumption that such evidence, in
proper form, is helpful 9 and that the jury will not misuse it if
proper instructions are given.' 0
A. The Use of Character Evidence to Impeach
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 43.07 governs im-
peachment in both civil and criminal cases." In all but one of the
5 Id. § 2.15.
Id. § 4.15(B). An exception is provided for impeachment by the use of prior felony
convictions relating to truth and veracity. Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.07 [hereinafter cited as CR].
See also LAwsoN, supra note 1, § 4.15, 55-56. For the complete text of CR 43.07, see note
1Iinra.
7 See generally LAwSON, supra note 1, §§ 2.05 & 2.10.
8 The authors treat evidence of prior criminal acts of the accused as a branch of the
law of character evidence. Again, the risk of admission is that evidence of a previous crime
will suggest that the accused person's character is consistent with the commission of the
crime in question. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBERG, A MODERN APPROACH TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 210, 226 (1977).
9 But see id. at 286 for the proposition that such a difference for impeachment is a
"specious distinction."
10 This is useful, if not altogether satisfactory fiction. In Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a limiting instruction was an
inadequate substitute for the protection of an accused's constitutional rights. "The effect is
the same as if there had been no instruction at all." Id. at 137.
11 CR 43.07 states in its entirety:
A witness may be impeached by any party, without regard to which party
produced him, by contradictory evidence, by showing that he had made
statements different from his present testimony, or by evidence that his gen-
eral reputation for untruthfulness renders him unworthy of belief; but not
by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of a witness, or record of a judgment, that he has been con-
victed of a felony.
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cases decided during the Survey period relating to impeachment,
the courts cited both the Civil Rule and Dean Lawson's hand-
book.12 In two cases, each characterized as a "swearing contest,"
the Court dealt with character evidence offered against an ac-
cused in a criminal prosecution.
In Carver v. Commonwealth,13 the defendant was charged
with trafficking in alcoholic beverages in a dry county. She
elected to testify, and the prosecution was permitted to present
rebuttal testimony by a police officer to the effect that defen-
dant's reputation for truth and veracity was bad. The testimony
was in the form permitted by CR 43.07 and admissible under the
rule that a criminal defendant who elects to testify may be im-
peached in the same manner as any other witness. 14 The case is
noteworthy only because the defense had urged reversal predi-
cated on the admission of this reputation evidence by mistakenly
citing that section of Dean Lawson's handbook relating to the
substantive use of character evidence.
Confusion regarding proper impeachment also arose in
Warner v. Commonwealth. 1 In that case the defendant had
been convicted of first-degree rape and sodomy allegedly com-
mited while the defendant was a deputy county jailer. The de-
fendant claimed on appeal that the court erroneously admitted
into evidence testimony concerning unrelated prior acts of sexual
misconduct of a different nature, involving different victims.
After holding that such evidence could not be admitted in chief16
and noting that "impeaching testimony has been the subject of
misunderstanding and improper evaluation,"'' the Kentucky Su-
preme Court ruled that the defendant had not opened the door to
the rebuttal testimony. The Court also might have noted that
neither the cross-examination nor the rebuttal testimony was in
the form allowed by CR 43.07.18
12 LAWSON, supra note 1, § 4.15.
13 634 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1982) (reversing defendant's conviction on other grounds).
H LAwsON, supra note 1, § 4.15(E).
15 621 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1981).
16 See text accompanying notes 40-59 infra for a discussion of substantive use of prior
acts evidence.
17 621 S.W.2d at 25.
18 See note 11 supra for a complete reading of CR 43.07. In Warner, the defense
1982-83]
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Similar confusion surrounds the use of testimony concerning
a witness's reputation for truth and veracity for purposes of reha-
bilitation. Specifically, a witness must have been impeached be-
fore his or her testimony may be bolstered by a reputation wit-
ness in an effort to rehabilitate the witness.19 This question also
arose in the Carver case,20 in which the Court suggested that re-
buttal testimony bolstering the prosecuting witness's reputation
for truth and veracity may have been admitted improperly if the
defendant had been foreclosed from cross-examining that witness
for bias and hostility. Similarly, in Ellis v. Ellis,2 1 the Court re-
versed the judgment in a civil case and ordered a new trial,
where the trail judge allowed a witness whose character had not
been attacked to be "rehabilitated" by a reputation witness.2
B. Substantive Use of Character Evidence
Kentucky law prohibits the use of character evidence for sub-
stantive purposes in civil cases, unless a trait of character is in is-
sue.23 In criminal cases, the prosecutor may not introduce evi-
dence regarding the character of the accused until the defendant
puts character in issue by attempting to show that his or her
character for a particular trait is inconsistent with the commis-
sion of the offense charged.24
might have challenged the ethical propriety of the cross-examination, which not only de-
manded that the defendant characterize the testimony of other witnesses, but also con-
tained an assertion by the prosecutor of his personal belief in the testimony of the wit-
nesses. See Ryan v. Monson, 179 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) (directing witnesses to
characterize the testimony of others as true or false). On personal opinion or belief, see
Underwood, Adversary Ethics: More Dirty Tricks, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. (1982) (to be pub-
lished).
19 LAWSON, supra note 1, § 4.15, at 55.
20 634 S.W.2d at 421.
21 612 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
22 The Court also reaffirmed the ancient Kentucky case of Vance v. Vance, 59 Ky. (2
Metcalf) 581 (Ky. 1859), which held that a witness who has been impeached by a prior in-
consistent statement may not be rehabilitated through the introduction of evidence of his
good reputation for truth and veracity. 612 S.W.2d at 748.
' An example would be a defamation case, where the defamatory statement
charged the plaintiff with dishonesty. See LAWSON, supra note 1, § 2.05, for the general
discussion of Kentucky law and this exception in civil cases. For a recent court statement
of the rule, see Ellis v. Ellis, 612 S.W.2d at 748.
24 LAwsON, supra note 1, § 2.10.
[Vol. 71
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In Neeley v. Commonwealth,2 the defendant was convicted
of second-degree manslaughter. The evidence at trial suggested
that the defendant was attempting to terrorize four teen-age boys
by pulling alongside their station wagon and engaging in harass-
ing tactics. The harassment ended abruptly when defendant's
car collided with an oncoming car, killing the other driver. The
defendant complained on appeal that the trial judge had erro-
neously allowed the teen-age boys to testify that they had not re-
ported the accident because they were afraid of the defendant's
family, which "had a bad reputation." The error was com-
pounded by the prosecutor's summation, which portrayed the
defendant as a person to be feared. In an unpublished opinion,
the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the defendant had not
put his character in issue and reversed the conviction with the
following observation:
[Tihere is no question but that, in this case, in spite of an ad-
monition by the trial judge with respect to only one of the wit-
nesses, the evidence was highly prejudicial to the movant. The
prosecution knew the value of the evidence to his case, as
shown by its very introduction and by his use of it in his closing
argument. In spite of the conflicting evidence, the jury not
only found movant guilty, but gave him the maximum sen-
tence.21
Although Kentucky law permits a defendant to introduce
evidence of the victim's character for violence in support of a
plea of self-defense, as tending to prove who was the first aggres-
sor,2 a recent case reaffirmed the long-standing rule in the Com-
monwealth that such character evidence must be in the form of
25 No. 81-SC-555-D (Ky. Mar. 30,1982).
26 Id., slip op. at 3. Compare this protection of prejudicial character evidence and
Warner v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d at 27 (permissible for defense counsel to inquire
of defendant while he is testifying in chief whether he committed the acts for which he
was indicted without opening the door to character impeachment; irrelevant or collateral
testimony also will not open the door) with Massengill v. Commonwealth, No. 81-SC-126-
MR, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Sept. 22, 1981) (in prosecution for first degree assault, prosecution's
reference to appellants dress and long hair and association with a "disreputable motor-
cycle club" not improper, since it depicted defendant's appearance at the time of the as-
sault and contrasted with his "immaculate" appearance at trial).
7 LAWSON, supra note 1, § 2.10.
1982-83]
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community reputation. In Commonwealth v. Thompson,8 the
court of appeals held that the admission of the victim's prior
criminal convictions was error because such convictions were
specific instances. of violence, or prior bad acts, and not evidence
of the victim's reputation in the community. Discretionary re-
view has been granted in this case; practitioners should be alert
to the Supreme Court's disposition.
II. PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Use of Prior Criminal Acts to Impeach
The general rule in Kentucky is that a witness, including an
accused who chooses to testify, may be impeached by proof of
felony convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false state-
ment.29 Cases decided during the Survey year further clarified
the types of crimes which may be used for impeachment.
In Moore v. Commonwealth,0 a murder defendant sought to
corroborate his alibi testimony by introducing the testimony of
one Lofton, who had been incarcerated with the "actual killer."
In an effort to discredit Lofton, the prosecution, during cross-
examination of the defendant, first injected a reference to
charges pending against him for kidnapping, capital murder and
robbery. These references to unresolved charges were followed
up on during the cross-examination of Lofton himself by ques-
tions relating to Lofton's prior convictions for murder and es-
cape. Noting that impeaching crimes must be felony convictions,
not pending charges, 31 and that homicide and escape do not rest
28 No. 81-CA-2262-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 4,1982) (29 Ky. L. SuMM. 7, at 5 [herein-
after cited as KLS]), discretionary review granted, No. 82-SC-518 (Ky. Oct. 6,1982).
29 LAWSON, supra note 1, § 4.20. However, such evidence may not be admitted until
a hearing is held outside the presence of the jury to determine that the nature of the con-
viction fits the rule and that its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice to the de-
fendant. Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970). For refinements of the
doctrine, see Lawson, Kentucky Law Survey-Evidence, 66 KY. L.J. 585, 600-04 (1977-
78) and Lawson, Kentucky Law Survey-Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 273-78 (1975-76).
30 634 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1982).
31 The conviction also may not be lacking in any formality. In Carver v. Common-
wealth, 634 S.W.2d at 420, the Court found error in admitting an unsigned prior convic-
tion to prove the defendant was a recidivist bootlegger deserving of enhanced punishment.
[Vol. 71
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on dishonesty, stealing or false swearing, the Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction. 32
The Kentucky courts continue to place no restriction on how
old a felony conviction may be and still be used. Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(b) limits the admissibility of criminal convictions
to those less than ten years old, unless the proponent of the evi-
dence gives advance written notice to the opposing party, and
the trial court determines that the probative value of the evi-
dence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 3
In Brewer v. Commonwealth,-4 the defendant was convicted
of stealing a motorcycle owned by a policeman. Although wit-
nesses testified to seeing the defendant loading the motorcycle
into his van and, in the appellate court's language, a "more sub-
stantial case could not have been made by the Commonwealth
absent motion pictures," the defendant contended that he had
taken the motorcycle "by mistake."' On appeal from his convic-
tion, his counsel complained that his client was impeached by a
prior felony conviction that was ten years old.," Both the client
and the lawyer were advised that Kentucky has not adopted Fed-
eral Rule 609(b), that prohibits evidence of stale convictions. The
remoteness of a conviction, however, is a proper subject for a
Kentucky trial court to consider at a hearing required by Cotton
v. Commonwealth.37
Aside from the Cotton hearing, few procedural safeguards
operate to prevent the admission of prior convictions. Although
the only criminal convictions that may be used for impeachment
purposes are felony convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or
false statement, a defendant must object to the introduction of a
misdemeanor conviction or waive the error, according to the Su-
preme Court's unpublished memorandum opinion in Wayne v.
32 The Court also rejected an argument that the impeachment was proper as tending
to show interest or bias. The testimony could not have benefitted Lofton, and to allow the
evidence as proof of some speculative general bias against the Commonwealth would
"swallow the Cotton rule whole in every case." 634 S.W.2d at 436.
3 3 FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
34 632 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
35 Id. at 457.
- Actually, the conviction was eight years old. Id.
37 See note 29 supra for discussion of a Cotton hearing.
1982-83]
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Commonwealth. 8 In addition, it is the duty of defense counsel to
seek a limiting instruction or admonition that the jury not view
the conviction as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
guilt. 39
B. Substantive Use of Prior Criminal Acts
Dean Lawson's treatise provides the general rule that
evidence of prior criminal acts of the accused is not admissible
substantively unless the evidence fits one of the established excep-
tions and the trial judge determines that the probative value of
the evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice.4 The Survey year
-8 No. 81-SC-265-MR (Ky. Sept. 22, 1981). One may question whether this opinion
furthers the policies of Cotton. See 454 S.W.2d at 698.
3 Edwards v. Commonwealth, No. 81-SC-651-MR, slip op. at 3 (Ky. Feb. 16, 1982)
(unpublished memorandum) (citing Romans v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 128 (Ky.
1977)). According to Brewer, the admonition may be given immediately after testimony
or at the conclusion of the witness' testimony. 632 S.W.2d at 457.
40 LAWSON, supra note 1, § 2.20 states in its entirety:
Sec. 2.20 Prior Criminal Acts of Accused
(A) General Rule: Evidence of the commission of crimes other than the one
that is the subject of a charge is not admissible to prove that an accused is a
person of criminal disposition. Such evidence, however, is admissible if of-
fered for one of the purposes described in subsections (B), (C), and (D), and
if the trial judge determines that the possibility of prejudice to the accused is
outweighed by the probative worth and need for the evidence.
(B) Interwoven Criminal Acts: Evidence that reveals an independent crim-
inal act by an accused is admissible if the independent crime is so interwoven
with evidence of the crime charged that its mention is both necessary and
appropriate.
(C) Independent Crimes Admissible for Limited Purpose: Evidence of the
commission of crimes other than the one charged is admissible if (1) offered
to prove motive, intent, knowledge, identity, plan or scheme, or absence of
mistake or accident, and (2) such evidence is relevant to the issues other than
in proof of a general criminal disposition in the accused.
(D) Prior Sexual Acts:
(1) Evidence of independent sexual acts between an accused and the victim
of an alleged sex crime is admisisble to prove a disposition and inclination in
the accused to engage in sexual acts with the victim. Upon admission of such
evidence, the trial court must admonish the jury that such evidence may be
used only to corroborate other testimony as to the offense charged.
HeinOnline  -- 71 Ky. L.J. 294 1982-1983
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contributed two interesting and important cases that demon-
strate that the Supreme Court will narrowly construe the excep-
tions allowing admission of other crimes evidence to insure that
the exceptions do not swallow the general rule or "stir such pas-
sion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial."'41
In O'Bryan v. Commonwealth,42 the Supreme Court was
presented with a classic problem of criminal evidence. The de-
fendant's former husband, O'Bryan, died in 1979 of acute arsenic
poisoning, and during the investigation of that death the police
learned that another former husband, Sadler, had died of un-
known causes in 1967. When Sadler's body was exhumed, au-
thorities determined that he too had died of acute arsenic poison-
ing. Additionally, the sister of the second husband, LeAnne
O'Bryan, became ill from what appeared to be arsenic poisoning
shortly after visiting her dying brother at the hospital with her
former sister-in-law, the defendant. She disclosed to the police
that she had told the defendant there would be "one hell of an in-
vestigation" if her brother died, and suspected that the defen-
dant had then put arsenic in "numerous cups of coffee" that de-
fendant brought to her during their vigil at the hospital.4 3
The defendant was indicted for the murder of both her
former husbands, and the indictments were severed for trial.
Shortly after the severance and the Commonwealth's notice that
it would seek the death penalty grounded on "murder for monet-
ary gain," the defendant was indicted for the attempted murder
of her former sister-in-law, LeAnne O'Bryan. This indictment
was joined for trial with the O'Bryan homicide.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to admit into evidence in
the O'Bryan cases references to and facts concerning the 1967
(2) Evidence of independent sexual acts between an accused and persons
other than the victim of an alleged sex crime, if such acts are similar to that
involved in the charge and not too remote in time, is admissible to prove a
disposition and lustful inclination in the accused, intent as to the act
charged, motive or a common plan, scheme, or pattern. Upon admission of
such evidence, the trial court must admonish the jury that such evidence
may be used only to corroborate other testimony as to the offense charged.
41 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 454 (2d ed. 1972).
42 634 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1982).
43 Id. at 155.
1982-83]
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death of Sadler. The Commonwealth also planned to introduce
evidence relating to yet another former husband, McGhee, to the
effect that the defendant had once furtively put some "white
powder" in his coffee. 44 The trial judge granted the Common-
wealth's motions and denied the defendant's subsequent motions
in limine.4s At trial, the defendant was portrayed as a "jealous
person acutely conscious of money and financial security" who
had killed her former husbands for financial gain. The defendant
was convicted of murder and attempted murder charged in the
O'Bryan cases and was sentenced to death.
The issue before the Kentucky Supreme Court in O'Bryan
was whether the trial court should have admitted evidence relat-
ing to the Sadler death, which was the subject of a periding in-
dictment, as well as evidence relating to the defendant's relation-
ship with her former husband, McGhee, under the exception
permitting proof of other crimes to show "a common plan or
scheme."46
The many reported cases in England and the United States
involving "other crimes" evidence present fact patterns as fasci-
nating as they are grisly.47 Moreover, many of the cases can be
reconciled only after a careful analysis of the many different
theories of admissibility that are grouped, too often and too read-
ily, under the heading of "common plan or scheme." Among the
cases are those in which a series of crimes have been committed
by a device or modus operandi which is "so unusual and distinc-
44 Id. at 157.45 Id. at 154.46 Presumably, the theory was that the evidence tended to prove identity by proving
an overall larger and continuing plan, a distinctive modus operandi, and a motive. See
generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41 at 451, for a discussion of the rationale.
The "identity" exception is most easily used by the Courts as evidenced by the
multitude of examples in LAWSON, supra note 1, § 2.20 while there are no common scheme
or plan examples. The unpublished case of Edwards v. Commonwealth, No. 81-SC-651-
MR, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Feb. 16, 1982), rejected the common scheme or plan argument of
the prosecutor but upheld the admission of evidence of prior criminal acts under the ra-
tionale of proving identity-even when the prosecutor did not advance this argument. In
one unpublished case during the Survey period, the Court accepted the common plan or
scheme exception. Beardsley v. Commonwealth, No. 80-SC-864-MR (Ky. July 7,1981).
47 For a delightful collection, the authors recommend J. WICMORE, CASES ON Evi-
DENCE (1906).
[Vol. 71
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tive as to be like a signature."'48 The leading case of this genre is
Regina v. Smith,49 the famous "brides of bath" case, wherein the
defendant murdered a series of wives, each time for financial
gain and each time by employing a special technique for drown-
ing the victim in the bathtub. w
Another class of cases involves proof of the existence of a
larger continuing plan, scheme or conspiracy. For example, in
Haley v. State5' the defendant was tried for the shotgun murder
of one Williams. The evidence tended to show that the defendant
had had an affair with Mrs. Williams, but had been unable to
persuade her to abandon her husband. The state was permitted
to introduce evidence that ten months prior to the murder of Mr.
Williams, the defendant's wife had died of strychnine poisoning.
The appellate court reversed the conviction, but in so doing pro-
vided a blueprint for the prosecution on retrial of the case. 52
Notwithstanding such notable precedents, the courts have
cautioned that before the jury is entitled to consider the other
crimes, there must be substantial evidence or "clear and convinc-
ing" evidenceP of the commission of the other crime and the de-
fendant's connection with it. In addition, the better reasoned
cases go beyond a mechanical pigeonholing of the evidence into
48 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, at 449.
49 84 L.J.K.B. (n.g.) 2153 (1915).
50 Justice Clayton, who filed a separate dissenting opinion in O'Bryan, apparently
felt that an arsenic poisoning "for profit" was a sufficiently distinctive modus operandi to
justify admission of evidence relating to Sadler's death. 634 S.W.2d at 159 (Clayton, J.,
dissenting).
5' 209 S.W. 675 (Tex. 1919).
52 The Court stated:
If, upon another trial, evidence is proffered sufficiently cogent to establish
the fact that appellants wife died from poison, we believe the evidence
should be received as coming within that exception to the rule excluding in-
dependent crimes which recognizes their admissibility when they are evi-
dence of a systematic plan formed and executed by the accused. This arises
from the theory advanced by the state that the appellant, desiring to con-
tinue unobstructed his illicit relations with the wife of deceased, formed a
plan to remove the obstacles, viz. his own wife and the deceased Williams,
and proof that he killed his wife in pursuance of his purpose to attain the
same object which would furnish the motive for the killing of the deceased
tended to identify appellant as the slayer of Williams.
Id. at 677-78.
5 Tucker v. State, 412 P.2d 970 (Nev. 1966).
1982-83]
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an arguable exception and emphasize the obligation of the trial
judge to exclude the "other crimes" evidence, even if it appears to
fit a pigeonhole of admissibility, if the probative value of the evi-
dence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.54
The O'Bryan case was a particularly challenging one, inas-
much as the multiple incidents of arsenic poisoning did present
something more distinctive than a string of crimes of the same
general class.- On the other hand, assuming that the prior death
was in fact the result of a criminal agency, specifically, the de-
fendant, it is debatable whether or not it involved so distinctive a
modus operandi as to provide compelling evidence of identity.
Similarly, the remoteness in time between the alleged "other
crime" and the crime charged arguably serves to distinguish the
case from Haley v. State. Even so, one may readily agree that the
trial judge had a basis for concluding that the evidence had some
probative value.
On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction. The Court focused on the absence of "substantial" evi-
dence that the Sadler death arose from a criminal instrumental-
ity, and, if so, whether the poison was administered by the de-
fendant.-, Moreover, although the opinion may have overstated
the case against the probative value of the evidence, the Court's
reversal of the jury verdict is amply justified on the theory that
the trial judge abused his discretion in not leaning in favor of ex-
clusion, to prevent the untried charge from bootstrapping an
otherwise close case.57
Within the Survey period, a second important case involving
other crimes evidence clarified the exception regarding indepen-
dent sexual acts between an accused and persons other than the
victim of the sex offense charged. In Warner v. Common-
54 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, at 454. McCormick cites Noor Mohamed v. The
King, [19491 App. C. 182, 192-93 (Privy Council) (error to admit evidence of the poison-
ing of a previous wife in a prosecution for spousal homicide by poisoning) and State v. Gil-
ligan, 103 A. 649, 653 (Conn. 1918) (error to admit evidence of other deaths by poison-
ig).
s Cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, at 449-50.
s 634 S.W.2d at 156.
57 Cf. Noor Mohamed v. The King, [19491 App. C. at 190-93 (a case virtually on all
fours with O'Bryan).
[Vol. 71
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wealth,58 the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence
relating to prior acts of sexual misconduct of a different nature,
and involving different victims, than the offenses charged. In re-
versing a jury verdict of conviction, the Court ruled that the
other instances of sexual misconduct recounted at trial did not
meet the standard of "close similarity" required to evidence a
scheme or pattern or to show a disposition to commit the crimes
charged. 59
III. HEARSAY
No Kentucky Law Survey of evidence would be complete
without a review of developments in the application of the hear-
say rule, and this Survey period contributed several opinions.6
The unpublished Supreme Court opinion in Shelby v. Com-
monwealth6 demonstrates continued reliance upon the garbage
can of "res gestae." In that case, the defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to commit first degree robbery and first degree as-
sault. He and two cohorts were indicted for assault in connection
with the shooting of Thelonius Hardin, whom they apparently
believed to be a drug dealer. The defendant and another co-con-
spirator entered the victim's apartment heavily armed. A third
co-conspirator overheard the defendant's partner say upon flee-
ing the scene: "Why did you do this man, why did you do this,
what did you shoot him for?" When the defendant challenged
the admission of this evidence on appeal, the Supreme Court up-
held its admission under the "res gestae" exception. 62 The
authors' criticism of the case is not a reflection on the result or the
close examination of the facts involving spontaneity, which were
clearly correct, but instead a criticism of the Court's continued
use of the doctrine of "res gestae."
W 621 S.W.2d at22 (Ky. 1982).
591d. at 26.
'o No attention will be given to the shopbok exception as discussed in O.C.E. v.
Commonwealth, 638 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretionary review denied, No.
82-SC-487-D (Ky. Oct. 6,1982).
61 No. 81-SC-452-MR (Ky. Feb. 16,1982).
62 The court also noted, correctly, that the statement was an excited utterance or a
spontaneous exclamation. 81-SC-452-MR, slip op. at 2. See LAWSON, supra note 1, § 8.60
for a discussion of res gestae and spontaneous statements as one and the same.
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Kentucky law has an unusual and progressive rule known as
the Jett doctrine regarding the extrajudicial inconsistent state-
ments of witnesses who testify at trial. Specifically, if the extraju-
dicial declarant appears as a witness at trial, is available for
cross-examination and is given an opportunity to explain a prior
inconsistent statement after a foundation is laid pursuant to CR
43.08, 4 then the inconsistent statement is admissible for proof of
the matter stated therein.
The case of Smith v. Commonwealths clarifies the applica-
tion of this rule. In Smith, the defendant and one Johnson met
their victim, Childers, with the putative intention of taking him
to a prostitute. All three drove off in Childers' car, with Johnson
in the back seat. However, after the car had proceeded only a
few blocks, Childers was told that their intention was robbery
and that Childers should pull over. When Childers pulled a gun
and the defendant shouted a warning, Johnson shot Childers in
the head, killing him. After Johnson was apprehended, he gave a
signed statement to the police. At defendant's trial, Johnson was
a hostile witness and was reluctant to answer questions regarding
his prior statement to the police. However, having pled guilty
and been sentenced, he had no right to refuse to testify. More-
over, he did eventually respond to the prosecution's questions.
The defense chose not to pursue a detailed cross-examination but
contended on appeal that the witness's hostility precluded full
and effective cross-examination and that the application of the
Jett doctrine was therefore improper.6 The Supreme Court re-
jected this contention, opining that the witness was available for
cross-examination 7 and that counsel should have posed any ques-
63 See Jettv. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); LAWSON, supra note 1, §
8.05. This exception is endorsed in Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 192-93 (1948).
6 The rule requires the following foundation to be laid: "(The witness] must be in-
quired of concerning [the prior inconsistent statement], with the circumstances of time,
place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them; and, if it
be in writing, it must be shown to the witness, with opportunity to explain it." CR 43.08.
65 634 S.W.2d411 (Ky. 1982).
66 The defendant relied upon Phillips v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980) (where witness' refusal to testify was based on a legitimate plea of the privilege
against self-incrimination, Jett doctrine would not apply).
61634 S.W.2d at 412. The opinion did not discuss any problems of the "confronta-
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tions he had to the witness and allowed the witness to refuse to
answer each question to create a record for appeal 61
IV. ADMISSIONS
In Huff v. Conway,69 the court of appeals further clarified
when a party's testimony may be held to be a judicial admission
sufficient to preclude the introduction of contradictory evidence
on the fact in issue. 70 Huff involved an action for legal malprac-
tice brought by Mrs. Huff against her former divorce attorney,
arising out of a December 1979, divorce. The action had been
brought upon the recommendation of her appellate counsel, at-
torney Porter. The defendant moved for summary judgment, as-
serting that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, 7'
suit having been filed on January 22, 1981. The plaintiffs at-
torney opposed the summary judgment on the ground that he
had not discovered and advised the plaintiff of her rights against
her former counsel until March 1980, and he countered the mo-
tion with an affidavit to that effect. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff
had testified in her deposition that attorney Porter had told her
of her potential malpractice claim more than one year before the
filing of the action.
The appellate court reversed, opining that the plaintiff's tes-
timony was not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to constitute a
judicial admission. After reviewing the transcript "as a whole,"
tion" clause of the sixth amendment. Presumably there were none. See, e.g., Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
68 634 S.W.2d at 413.
69 No. 81-CA-1305-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 29 KLS
15, at 6 (Dec. 15, 1982).
70 The doctrine that testimony may constitute a judicial admission is discussed in
LAWsON, supra note 1, § 8.10.
71 Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.245 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
KRS] provides in pertinent part:
[A] civil action, whether brought in tort or contract, arising out of any act or
omission in rendering, or failing to render, professional services for others
shall be brought within one (1) year from the date of the occurrence or from
the date when the cause of action was, or reasonably should have been, dis-
covered by the party injured.
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the court could not say for sure whether the plaintiff knew or
understood the exact nature of her deposition testimony.72 Be-
cause her statements on deposition were not conclusive judicial
admissions, the court concluded that attorney Porter's affidavit
as well as the plaintiffs confusing and contradictory deposition
testimony presented a genuine issue of fact precluding the entry
of summary judgment.
A similar issue was presented in American States Insurance
Company v. Audubon Country Club,73 in which the plaintiff
Davis was injured in a golf cart accident and sued the driver of
the cart and Audubon Country Club, the lessor of the cart and
owner of the premises. The accident was allegedly the result of
the golf cart being driven at a high rate of speed down a steep
cart path, together with a possible malfunctioning of the cart it-
self. The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the
driver, on the basis of what it viewed as a "judicial admission" by
the plaintiff Davis concerning the driver's operation of the cart.
Specifically, Davis was asked on cross-examination whether the
driver had done anything Davis saw to make the cart turn over,
to which Davis answered, "No, sir." The cross-examiner did not
develop whether the driver had been driving fast, as other wit-
nesses testified, whether Davis had been observant at the time or
whether there was any malfunction of the vehicle. The appellate
72 No. 81-CA-1305-MR slip op. at 8. The court relied upon Sutherland v. Davis, 151
S.W.2d 1021 (Ky. 1941), which enumerated the factors to be considered in determining
whether testimony should constitute a judicial admission:
(2) Was his intelligence ... such that he fully understood the purport of the
questions and the answers thereto? (3) What was the nature of the facts to
which he testified? Was he simply giving his impressions of an event as a
participant or an observer, or was he testifying to facts peculiarly within his
own knowledge? (4) Is his testimony contradicted by that of other witnesses?
(5) Is the effect of his testimony clear and unequivocal, or are his statements
inconsistent and conflicting?
151 S.W.2d at 1024 (quoting Harlow v. Laclair, 136 A. 128 (N.H. 1927)).
The Supreme Court opinion reviewing Huff v. Conway did not turn on Mrs.
Huff's equivocal testimony concerning when she was told of her right to sue. Instead the
Court reasoned that the statute of limitations began to run on January 18, 1980, when she
was told she had been poorly represented. In other words it is the date of discovery of the
alleged wrong that controls, and not the date of discovery of a right to sue for that wrong.
73 No. 81-CA-859-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 21, 1982) (29 KLS 6 at 8), discretionary
review granted, No. 82-SC-682 (Ky. Oct. 5, 1982).
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court held that the trial court had erred, finding that Davis' two-
word answer was simply testimony of a "negative nature" that
admitted nothing and did not justify a directed verdict in the
driver's favor.74 The court of appeals decision is not final because
the Supreme Court has granted review of the case.
V. OPINION
Although the mere fact that a witness is a police officer will
not qualify him or her to give an expert opinion concerning an
automobile accident, several cases have held that police officers
may testify as to the speed of the vehicle and the location of the
point of impact if they have had some special training and experi-
ence and have adequately investigated physical evidence at the
scene.75 The court of appeals' decision in Southwood v. Harri-
son76 not only provides a useful summary and analysis of the cases
but also offers a reasoned approach to such expert testimony.
The case involved a head-on collision between two coal
trucks, in which both drivers were killed. There were no wit-
nesses, and, by the time state police arrived, a "multitude" of
people had obliterated any traces of skid marks that might have
existed on the dusty coal haul road. In addition, there was no vis-
ible debris that would tend to indicate the point of impact, and
no evidence of the speed of either vehicle. The only apparent
way the accident could have happened was that one vehicle had
crossed the center line. Accordingly, the point of impact was the
ultimate issue.
As to that issue, the plaintiff offered the testimony of a state
police officer who had received the same fifty hours of classroom
instruction on accident reconstruction as all other state police of-
ficers. In addition, the officer had been on the force for only a
year and had investigated only about 125 accidents.7 Doubting
74 29 KLS 6 at 9 (citing Bryant v. Corley, 455 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1970), and MeCal-
lum v. Harris, 379 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1964)). However, the court did not reverse, since the
plaintiff had recovered an adequate and collectible judgment against the remaining party.
75 LAWSON, supra note 1, § 6.15.
76 638 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretionary review denied (Ky. Oct. 5,
1982).
77 The record was not developed to show how many of these accident investigations
involved reconstruction.
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that the officer was any more qualified than any other officer,
the court turned to the physical evidence upon which the officer
purported to base his testimony. Finding that the officer was
relying only upon the post accident position of the vehicles7s and
an unsupported assumption that neither vehicle had moved for-
ward after impact 79 the court distinguished the case from prior
decisions approving police testimony regarding point of impact so
and reversed a judgment for the plaintiff.
VI. DEAD MAN's STATUTE
Mershon v. Land,81 presented yet another instance of at-
torney confusion surrounding the application of the Common-
wealth's most unnecessary statute. In that case, Mershon claimed
to have entered into an oral contract with Land to raise a tobacco
crop on Land's farm. He began to work the farm, but Land sold
the property to his children who raised the crop themselves. Mer-
shon sued for breach of contract, but died prior to the trial of the
action. The action was prosecuted by his administratrix.
In order to prove the existence of the oral contract, Mershon's
administratrix offered the testimony of the landowner and the
deposition of the landowner's wife. The trial court sustained the
landowner's objection to the use of such evidence on the theory
that it involved a transaction with the deceased tenant and,
therefore, should be excluded under the Dead Man's Statute.
The Court of Appeals reversed, pointing out that the statute pro-
vides that "no person shall testify for himself concerning any ver-
bal statement of, or any transaction with .... One who is...
dead .... 82 The statute did not prohibit the use of Land's testi-
78 This is an impermissible reliance, according to Steely v. Hancock, 340 S.W.2d 467
(Ky. 1960) (post-accident position of vehicles alone will not suffice as evidence of their po-
sitions at impact).
79 This is an unsupportable assumption since one truck had been loaded with coal
and one had been empty.
go See, e.g., Mulberry v. Howard, 457 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1970) (visible skid marks
and important tell-tale debris); Moore v. Wheeler, 425 S,W.2d 541 (Ky. 1968) (lengthy
skid marks and other physical evidence).
81 602 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
82 Id. at 187 (quoting KRS § 421.210(2)).
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mony if it was against his interest.A3 Moreover, the court pointed
out that the deceased's administratrix could waive the bar of the
Dead Man's Statute, since the bar exists solely for the protection
of the deceased's estate and not for the other party to the alleged
transaction.'"
VII. PRIVILEGE"'
The issue in Commonwealth v. Boarman,86 was whether
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 199.335(7) abrogates
the husband-wife privilege in criminal cases involving child
abuse or neglect, as well as in actions in Juvenile Court. The sta-
tute provided:
Neither the husband-wife nor any professional-client privilege,
except the attorney-client privilege, shall be a ground for refus-
ing to report under this section or for excluding evidence re-
garding an abused or neglected child or the cause thereof, in
any judicial proceedings resulting from a report pursuant to
this section. "I
The defendant was charged with first-degree sexual abuse of his
three-and-a-half-year-old daughter, after the defendant's wife
had reported the incident to Protective Services and later to the
Jefferson County Police. She also provided a detailed statement
to the Commonwealth's Attorney. In sustaining a motion to ex-
clude the wife's statements and testimony from evidence pur-
suant to the statutory husband-wife privilege, KRS section
421.210(1),88 the trial judge ruled that the abolition of the priv-
8 3 id.
84 Id.
I Privileges are discussed in LAwsoN, supra note 1, at ch. 5. Two cases which re-
fused to apply privilege but were not chosen for discussion in this Survey are Schooler v.
Commonwealth, 628 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary review denied, (Ky.
Mar. 23, 1982) (approving use of juvenile records in a presentence investigation report)
and Tabor v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1981) (approving use of information
of probation or parole officer for habitual offender).
86 610 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), discretionary review denied, (Ky. Feb. 13,
1981).
8 KRS § 199.335(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
8 KRS § 421.210(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) states in its entirety:
In all actions between husband and wife, or between either or both of them
1982-83]
HeinOnline  -- 71 Ky. L.J. 305 1982-1983
KENTUCKY LAW JouNAL. [Vol. 71
ilege contained in KRS section 199.335 applied only to cases re-
lating to the protection and removal of an abused child by the Ju-
venile Court. The court of appeals reversed, on the ground that
the legislature is presumed to have intended that there be no such
exceptions to the abolition of the privilege. Moreover, the court
reasoned that the legislative intent was to have the protective
agency report child abuse to the proper authorities for whatever
action was necessary. Because the criminal proceedings in circuit
court resulted from a report to Protective Services, the proceed-
ing fell within the language of the waiver provisions of KRS sec-
tion 199.355(7).89
and another, either or both of them may testify as other witnesses, except as
to confidential communications between them during marriage, provided,
however, that in an action for absolute divorce or divorce from bed and
board, either or both of them may testify concerning any matter involved in
the action, including questions of property, and provided further, that
neither may be compelled to testify for or against the other.
89 The Court also noted the trend to limit the marital privilege, citing former Chief
Justice Palmore's observation in Wells v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1978)
that "the rule that one party to a marriage cannot be compelled to testify against the
other, codified in KRS 421.210, is one of the most inl-founded precepts to be found in the
common law." 562 S.W.2d at 624.
'It is interesting to note that KRS § 199.335 was repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1980,
ch. 280, S 152, 1980 Ky. Acts 915, effective July 1, 1982. Its counterpart is now KRS S
208B.030(5), which reads the same except that the following sentence has been added:
"This subsection shall also apply in any criminal proceeding in district or circuit court re-
garding an abused or neglected child."
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